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Abstract 
In response to its democratic deficit, the EU has increasingly turned to 
stakeholder involvement in the decision-making process through consultations. 
Such stakeholder involvement, however, can potentially have a negative effect on 
decision-making efficiency, slowing down decision-making by increasing 
administrative work and the transaction costs for bargaining in legislative 
institutions. However, survival analyses – based on a unique dataset of the 2009-
2010 online public consultations and the follow-up (non-)legislative acts – show 
that the number of stakeholders involved in fact improves the decision-making 
efficiency. The heterogeneity of their interests, on the other hand, does not affect 
the decision-making. 
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has long been concerned with building on democratic 
principles such as representativeness, equality, participation and deliberation. 
Nonetheless, the main critique on the EU has been its lack of democratic 
principles and legitimacy, otherwise known as the democratic deficit (Beetham 
and Lord, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002; Follesdal and Hix, 2006). The EU has 
addressed this deficit in several ways, in particular by increasing the 
participation of non-state stakeholders in the decision-making process (Schulz 
and König, 2000: 654; Balme and Chabanet, 2008: 90). Indeed, since the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission has been mandated to “consult widely” 
with a broad range of actors “before proposing legislative acts” (European 
Commission, 2007: Art1, 8b). Online consultations are perhaps the Commission’s 
most noticeable and widely used instrument of stakeholder involvement (Balme 
and Chabanet, 2008; Hüller and Kohler-Koch, 2008). This thesis examines the 
extent to which these consultations have altered the EU’s decision-making 
process. The question addressed here is not whether stakeholder involvement 
has assuaged the EU’s democratic deficit. Instead, the question is to what extent 
stakeholder involvement has affected decision-making efficiency in the EU. 
Scholars acknowledge a fundamental trade-off between democratic 
legitimacy and efficiency. While increased stakeholder participation leads to 
more input- and output-legitimacy, it also tends to diminish decision-making 
efficiency (Hüller and Kohler-Koch, 2008; Quittkat and Finke, 2008; Rasmussen 
and Toshkov, 2013). In other words, increasing the number stakeholders 
involved in the decision-making process has the potential to delay or block the 
speed with which legislation is passed. The inclusion of a broad range of actors 
disperses power, making it more difficult to reach a decision because more 
actors have power to block the process and are less likely to find agreement 
(König, 2008; Rasmussen and Toshkov, 2013). Some scholars even claim that the 
involvement of stakeholders limits the representativeness and legitimacy of the 
decision-making process (Quittkat and Finke, 2008; Rasmussen and Carroll, 
2013). Still, the consequences of stakeholder participation in decision-making 
processes have rarely been examined in a systematic and empirical manner. This 
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thesis seeks to address this oversight and poses the following question: what is 
the effect of stakeholder involvement on decision-making efficiency of the EU? 
 Based on the literature this thesis starts out arguing that the involvement 
of stakeholders in the EU’s decision-making process reduces decision-making 
efficiency. More specifically, the more stakeholders involved, the longer it takes 
for legislation to pass from the proposal stage to its adoption in EU law. 
However, the survival analysis that is used to assess the effects of stakeholder 
involvement on decision-making efficiency, while controlling for several 
alternative explanations, shows something completely different. The analysis of a 
unique dataset of 397 different procedural acts – including the legislative and 
non-legislative acts that are preceded by the 2009 and 2010 online public 
consultations and different non-legislative and legislative acts without 
consultation – show that the number of stakeholders, regardless of the 
heterogeneity of their interests, actually increases the decision-making efficiency 
by functioning as a transmission belt for citizens’ interests and by solving 
conflicts before a proposal is introduced. 
 
A theory of decision-making efficiency 
Scholars have identified a wide range of related factors affecting decision-making 
efficiency. In particular, there are four main factors explaining decision-making 
efficiency in the EU put forth in the existing literature: (1) the procedure and the 
involvement of decision-making institutions, (2) the voting rule, (3) the power of 
involved institutions, (4) the heterogeneity of interests of actors within and 
between institutions. The fourth factor is usually linked to the influence of the 
issue-area and the type of legislative act. In what follows I will discuss each factor 
in turn and add stakeholders as a fifth factor.  
First, decision-making efficiency is influenced by the setup of the 
decision-making procedure and the involvement of decisive institutions and 
actors (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013: 4). This means that, generally speaking, 
adding a decision-making institution disperses power and cripples efficiency 
because it is more difficult to find a consensus between more institutions 
(Tsebelis and Garret, 2000). As a result, the voting rule is influential because it 
sets the requirement for approval of legislative or non-legislative act through 
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those institutions and thus limits the decision-making procedure (Klüver and 
Sagarzazu, 2013: 1).  
The actual powers of the involved institutions matter as well (Tsebelis 
and Garret, 2000). For example, even under procedures where the European 
Parliament is marginally involved it still has considerable power over the 
decision-making process and thus influences this process and its efficiency (Selck 
and Steunenberg, 2004: Kardasheva, 2009). Adding other – yet less powerful – 
actors such as the Council of Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) can have similar effects on decision-making efficiency. 
Hence some scholars stress that it is important to not only consider veto-players, 
or decisive actors and institutions, but that all political actors that can potentially 
affect decision-making efficiency should be covered (Rasmussen and Toshkov, 
2013; Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013). The interests of all these actors involved are 
crucial for decision-making efficiency. After all, all actors and legislative bodies in 
the decision-making process must agree to reach a decision (Schulz and König, 
2000: 654; Selck, 2004; Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013: 4).  
Schulz and König, among others, frame the influence of actors in the 
perspective of the heterogeneity of interests (2000: 658). The heterogeneity of 
interests is relevant because when actors are not aligned it is more difficult to 
find common ground between those actors and reach a decision, and to reach it 
in a timely fashion (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013). The inclusion of the Parliament 
in the process due the changes of the Lisbon Treaty had precisely these 
consequences (Tsebelis and Garret, 2000). As a result, high heterogeneity of 
interests between institutions limits efficiency (Schulz and König, 2000: 665; 
Golub, 2008: 169; Rasmussen and Toshkov, 2013: 9). Additionally, the 
heterogeneity of interests within institutions is important as well, since it makes 
it harder to create a coalition that has sufficient votes to make a decision. This is 
especially the case insofar as the EU is a consensus-minded institution (Schulz 
and König, 2000; Golub, 2008).  
The issue area of the legislative act is linked to the heterogeneity of 
interests in that it determines the distributional consequences for member states 
(Schulz and König, 2000; König, 2007; Golub, 2008). Member states adjust their 
preferences according to their evaluation of the distributional consequences. As 
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a result, when member states believe the distribution is not equal it leads to 
different interests and priorities among these member states which increase the 
heterogeneity of interests. 
The type of legislative act is also linked to the heterogeneity of interests 
because it determines the procedure and the saliency of the legislation (Schulz 
and König, 2000). Legislative acts have a different procedure than, for example, 
implemented or delegated acts. Additionally, the type of legislative acts creates 
differences of saliency. Directives are more influential than other legislative acts 
because they are primarily concerned with laying down broad policy principles 
and relate to substantial consequences (Golub, 2008: 172). More importantly, 
directives usually require a change in domestic law, making member 
governments less flexible when negotiating a directive, which increases the 
heterogeneity of interests between the member states (Schulz and König, 2000: 
658). Because directives are deemed so important they are more contentious 
and salient. Consequently, member states want to be more involved when a 
directive affects their interests than when deciding over other types of legislative 
acts. The combination of the high heterogeneous interests and low flexibility 
affects the decision-making efficiency.  
 Formal decision-making institutions and their interests are not the only 
relevant factors influencing decision-making efficiency. The interests of actors 
outside the formal process – such as stakeholders – are relevant as well, mainly 
because they affect crucial factors that influence the decision-making process 
and its efficiency: the number of actors (and interests) and the heterogeneity of 
interests (Rasmussen and Toshkov, 2013; Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of stakeholders has mostly been absent from 
empirical studies concerning decision-making efficiency – a fact that is surprising 
given that the heterogeneity of preferences is assigned such significance in the 
literature (Dür, 2009).  
 The exclusion of stakeholders in these studies is especially striking when 
taking into account that stakeholders create considerable conflict in the decision-
making process and are not limited to policy niches, making them suitable 
candidates to influence decision-making efficiency (Gray and Lowery, 2000). 
Moreover, stakeholders have gained increased importance in the EU and their 
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opportunities to influence decisions have institutionalized through the use of 
consultations as well (Beyers et al., 2008; Quittkat and Finke: 2008: 183; 
Quittkat, 2011: 654). Furthermore, the influence of stakeholders is not limited to 
consultations. Numerous studies have shown that the EU’s extensive lobbying-
regime provides many opportunities to impact decision-making throughout the 
process (e.g. Eising, 2008; Coen, 2012; Beyers et al., 2010; Mahoney, 2008; Van 
Schendelen, 2010; Liebert, 2005; Klüver, 2012).  
Still, most scholars concentrate on the strategies rather than on the 
outcomes of stakeholder involvement (Rasmussen and Toshkov, 2013: 8). Those 
who do focus on the outcomes of stakeholder involvement usually do not focus 
on the procedural aspects such as its efficiency but on the effectiveness of the 
outcome of the decision-making when involving stakeholders (Beierle, 2002). 
The costs and repercussions of stakeholder involvement on the decision-making 
process remain understudied (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 58).  
Only Rasmussen and Toshkov (2013) addressed the effects of stakeholder 
involvement on decision-making efficiency and found that stakeholders increase 
‘the transaction costs of subsequent bargaining by prolonging the time needed to 
form the necessary coalitions to reach legislative deals’ which increases the 
legislative duration (2013: 27). Irvin and Stansbury (2004) also claim that, from 
a governing point of view, the main cost of stakeholder participation is that the 
decision-making process can become time-consuming and costly. In addition, 
government can lose control over the process and – because stakeholders often 
have different interests than government – end up with outcomes that are not 
preferred. Stakeholders usually possess vital resources which they can use to put 
up resistance to ensure that reaching a decision takes a long time. Sometimes 
they can even block decisions that are not in line with their interest (Edelenbos 
and Klijn, 2006: 5-7). In other words, the involvement of stakeholders can have a 
significant negative effect on the efficiency of the decision-making process 
(Kohler-Koch and Finke, 2007).  
These disadvantages are, however, neglected by most scholars because 
the benefits of a more legitimate process are assumed to outweigh the costs. 
Some even claim that the participation of stakeholders can lower their own veto-
powers which, accordingly, will make the process more efficient (Edelenbos and 
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Klijn, 2006; Glicken, 2000). Nevertheless, these arguments are mainly based on 
assumptions. There are very few studies that actually measure the negative 
effects such as efficiency loss by including stakeholders in the process while 
there are adequate reasons to believe these effects are present (Furlong and 
Kerwin, 2005). 
 
Towards a theory of stakeholder involvement and decision-
making efficiency 
Involving stakeholders through online public consultations in the decision-
making progress influences two crucial factors that affect the decision-making 
efficiency: the number of actors (and interests) in the decision-making process 
and the heterogeneity of interests in the decision-making process.  
 The effect of stakeholder involvement on decision-making efficiency is 
especially likely because of the growing number of stakeholders and the 
increasing and institutionalizing opportunities to influence the decision-making 
process through the extensive consultation- and lobby-regime. It is only logical to 
assume that when legislation is popular during the consultation process is it 
likely to be lobbied during the entire decision-making process. It would be 
illogical for stakeholders to attend a consultation and not get involved in the 
legislation that follows from that consultation. As a result, it is expected that the 
involvement of stakeholders has considerable influence on the decision-making 
procedure and its efficiency. 
The effects of stakeholder involvement depend on the type of decision-
making efficiency at issue, as decision-making efficiency can be understood in 
two different ways: mechanical lourdeur and substantive lourdeur (Schulz and 
König, 2000). Mechanical lourdeur refers to the legislative quantity and 
especially the speed of the legislative process. By contrast, substantive lourdeur 
refers to the substantive content of legislation. This thesis will focus on 
mechanical lourdeur – with the duration of the decision-making process as its 
indicator – since the substantive lourdeur is very difficult to assess empirically.  
 One way stakeholder involvement can influence decision-making 
efficiency is through the inclusion of more actors in the decision-making process. 
When many actors have influence over a decision it usually cripples decision-
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making efficiency, according to the iron law of oligarchy. When stakeholders are 
involved it means that all their interests have to be integrated into the decision-
making process. This is a difficult task, especially because the EU is focused on 
finding a consensus. Thus, including extra interests by involving stakeholders 
leads to more administrative work which increases the duration of the decision-
making process. In addition, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2013) have shown that 
consultations increase the decision-making duration by increasing the 
transaction costs of bargaining by requiring the decision-makers to spend more 
time to form the necessary coalitions to reach legislative deals. Because the 
interests of the legislative bodies such as the European Parliament are not 
always congruent with those of the stakeholders, the Parliament has to deal with 
all these interests to resolve matters before finishing the legislative act. The 
greater the number of stakeholders, the harder it is for the Parliament to resolve 
matters and reach the required coalition in a timely manner. Therefore, 
stakeholder involvement affects the mechanical efficiency purely by inflating the 
number of actors, and subsequently, the number of interests, immensely. This 
leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: The greater the number of stakeholders involved in the consultation  
process, the less efficient the decision-making process will be. 
 
It is also expected that the heterogeneity of the interests of stakeholders, which 
refers to the differences of the interests of stakeholders with respect to a certain 
goal, influences decision-making efficiency (Schulz and König, 2000). When there 
are more differences between interests of stakeholders it is more difficult for the 
EU to integrate these interests into the decision-making process – especially 
when these interests bring in new dimensions on a subject. Environmental 
organizations can, for example, bring in a new dimension on a legislative act on 
food safety. These differences between interests do not only create more 
administrative work but make it more difficult to find a consensus and thus 
slows down the decision-making process. Although the content of interests and 
their differences are only really measurable by analyzing the real opinions of 
these stakeholders, interests are more likely to be more heterogeneous when the 
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stakeholders are very different from each other; or in other words, when the 
stakeholders are diverse. When stakeholders have, for example, different 
organizational structures, priorities and goals, it is more likely they have 
different interests with respect to a certain goal. This leads to the second 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: The greater the diversity of the stakeholders involved in the 
consultation process, the less efficient the decision-making process 
will be. 
 
Additionally, this study controls for the formal decision-making institutions that 
influence decision-making efficiency. Although the institutional setup is mostly 
constant, the number of formal institutions involved is not. For instance, the EU 
is mandated to ask opinions of the EESC and the CoR on many occasions. 
Involvement of more decision making-institutions makes it harder to find 
common ground by increasing the possibility of a greater heterogeneity of 
interests between institutions, and thus slows down the decision-making 
process. As a result, the third hypothesis is:  
 
H3: The more decision-making institutions are included in the decision-
making process, the less efficient the decision-making process will be. 
Another factor influencing decision-making efficiency is the type of legislative 
act. Both Schulz and König (2000) and Golub (2008) have argued that because 
directives are more general and influential than regulations and decisions, 
member governments are less flexible and their preferences are more 
heterogeneous when negotiating a directive. This makes it difficult to reach a 
decision in a timely fashion. Hence this needs to be controlled for when assessing 
the influence of stakeholders. Consequently, the fourth hypothesis is: 
 
H4: Directives will lead to less efficiency in the decision-making process 
than regulations or decisions.  
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Research design 
The participation of stakeholders through consultations has intensified mainly 
because the EU uses consultations as the main instrument to address its 
‘democratic deficit’. In addition, these consultations have further 
institutionalized as a result of Article 2 of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principle of the Lisbon Treaty that intensifies the use of consultations even more. 
Thus, in theory and in practice the participation of stakeholders has become very 
important within the EU these last years, making the post-Lisbon period the 
appropriate timeframe to study the influence of stakeholder involvement on 
decision-making efficiency. Therefore the theory is tested with the 2009-2010 
online public consultations with the Commission and the legislative and non-
legislative acts that have followed from these consultations. The pre-Lisbon 
consultations are not included so as to avoid problems stemming from changes 
made to the EU decision-making process laid down in this Treaty. Ideally, 
consultations after 2010 should be included as well. However, many of these 
consultations after 2010 have not yet led to legislative and non-legislative acts. 
The few that are, are usually in the very beginning of the decision-making 
process. Although those are still useful there is very little finished legislation 
from these 2010-consultations to compare them with. In addition, it was out of 
the limits of this thesis because of the time and effort needed to include this. 
Hence it became impractical to include consultations after 2010.  
The consultations and the legislative and non-legislative acts that follow 
from these consultations are coded by going through three official online 
databases of the EU: Your Voice in Europe 1 , PreLex 2  and Legislative 
Observatory3. Your Voice in Europe is the EU-database organizing all public 
consultations the Commission had with stakeholders since 2001. It has a great 
deal of information on these consultations, and the reactions on these 
consultations are documented and accessible. PreLex and Legislative 
Observatory are both official EU-databases on EU-legislation that track the inter-
institutional procedures of the EU-institutions during the decision-making 
                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/consultations/index_en.htm. 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en#.  
3 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/home/home.do. 
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process. The Legislative Observatory is oriented from the point of view of the 
Parliament while PreLex is oriented around the actions of the Commission. 
Consequently, these databases are overlapping and complementary. 
The dataset is created by starting with the online consultations 
documented in Your Voice, which gives basic information on the consultations, 
such as the opening and closing date, the subject, the target group, and the 
objective. In addition, the reactions on these consultations and sometimes the 
follow-up actions of the EU as a result of these consultations are available as well.  
 
Table 1: Selection of legislative acts not preceded by consultationsc 
  Consulted 
legislation 
in dataset 
Total 
population 
legislation  
Population 
legislative 
process  
Target 
popu-
lationc 
Sample 
un-
consulted 
legislation  
2009 Decision 2 204 33 31 2 
 Directive 8 21 17 9 8 
 Regulation 9 109 43 34 8 
2010 Decision 5 224 10 5 4 
 Proposal for a directive 3 31a 18b 15 3 
 Directive 8 18 16 8 3 
 Proposal for a regulation 1 154a 19b 18 1 
     
 
Regulation 11 132 64 53 10 
 Recommendation 1 20 0 0 0 
2011 Proposal for a decision 2 198a 12b 10 2 
 Decision  5 182 8 3 0 
 Proposal for a directive 20 54a 37b 17 10 
 Directive 2 13 12 10 3 
 Proposal for a regulation 20 235a 100b 80 16 
     
 
Regulation 5 128 40 35 4 
2012 Proposal for a decision  2 203a 7b 5 1 
 Proposal for a directive 10 30a 24b 14 6 
 Proposal for a regulation 6 145a 54b 48 5 
2013 Proposal for a regulation 1 51a 1b 0 0 
a. Includes finished legislation as well while the proposal-category is used for unfinished 
legislation  
b. Only includes unfinished legislation for ‘proposal-categories’. 
c. Categories without cases are omitted. 
 
The Legislative Observatory and PreLex are used to find legislative and 
non-legislative acts that followed from the consultations mentioned in Your 
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Voice. Not all consultations led to a legislative or non-legislative act, however. 
These acts were searched based on the actions stated by the EU or by manually 
linking the legislative and non-legislative acts with the consultations. After that 
the decision-making process was measured by using information such as dates of 
adoptions and decisions, procedures, decision-rules and formations of actors.  
Legislation that was not preceded by online consultations is also included 
to control for the influence of consultations on legislation (Table 1). By including 
legislation without consultations a baseline of the decision-making process and 
its efficiency is created which gives a point of reference. Only when including 
decision-making efficiency without stakeholder involvement the influence of 
stakeholder involvement on decision-making efficiency can be assessed.  
 
Table 2: Selection of non-legislative acts not preceded by consultationsc 
  Consulted 
legislation 
in dataset 
Total 
population 
legislation  
Population 
legislative 
process  
Target 
popu-
lationc 
Sample 
un-
consulted 
legislation  
2009 Communication 14 159 - 145 14 
 Green paper 4 7 7 3 3 
 Resolution EP 1 390 - 381 1 
2010 Recommendation 1 20 17 16 1 
 Communication 25 145 - 120 25 
 Green paper 5 11 11 6 5 
 White paper 1 1 0 0 0 
 Resolution EP 1 511 - 510 1 
2011 Decision 1 182 174 173 1 
 Proposal for a directive  2 54 a 7 b 5 2 
 Communication 26 145 - 119 26 
 Green paper 1 13 13 12 1 
2012 Proposal for a decision  1 203 a - 195 1 
 Proposal for a directive 1 30 a 3 b 2 1 
 Communication 10 128 - 118 10 
 Green paper 2 4 4 1 1 
 White paper 1 1 0 0 0 
 Resolution EP 2 368 - 366 2 
2013 Communication 8 70 - 62 8 
a. Includes finished  non-legislative acts as well while the proposal-category is used for unfinished 
non-legislative acts  
b. Only includes unfinished non-legislative acts for ‘proposal-categories’. 
c. Categories without cases are omitted. 
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The legislative acts that are not preceded by consultations are randomly 
chosen by categorizing the legislation that was preceded by online consultations 
in draft-year and type of legislative act, to make sure these factors do not 
intervene (Table 1). The goal was to create equal groups of legislation of those 
that were preceded by consultations, and those that weren’t. This was done by 
searching the same type of legislation per year in PreLex. For each group all the 
legislation (the population) was searched and extracted, but only used when the 
legislation was reached through the legislative process (minus the already 
included legislation that was preceded by consultations). This left a group of 
legislation (the target population) that is similar in year and type of legislation to 
the consulted included legislation but that is not yet included in the database. 
From this target group it was checked whether an online public consultation 
preceded the legislation by going through the drafts and the publications. Only 
legislation from this group that was not the result of online consultations was 
included up until the same amount of the consulted legislation was reached.  
The same was done for non-legislative acts (Table 2). It should be 
mentioned that this does not mean all cases are included in the analyses. Some 
have, for example, missing values on crucial variables and others are outliers, 
which makes them unusable for analysis. Other files could not be categorized. 
The legislative and non-legislative acts that could not be classified are also 
removed from the analysis and are not presented in Table 2. 
 
Dependent variable: decision-making efficiency 
Measuring decision-making efficiency, although it sounds straightforward, is a 
difficult task. The efficiency of the decision-making process is best explained by 
stressing both the mechanical and substantive efficiency of the process (Schulz 
and König, 2000). However, scholars such as Schulz and König (2000), Sloot and 
Verschuren (1990), Golub (1999), and Rasmussen and Toshkov (2013) all stress 
the mechanical efficiency – which is the speed of the decision-making process 
and the quantity of its output – as the only variable that can be operationalized 
fairly well. They all focus on the duration of the decision-making process as the 
main indicator of (mechanical) efficiency. Consequently, the same indicator is 
used in this study.  
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Decision-making duration is measured in two ways. First, the number of 
days between the proposal of a legislative or non-legislative act and its 
completion is used as the decision-making duration4. This is measured by 
following the dates of different files and actors in the Legislative Observatory and 
PreLex, which monitor every actor and step in the decision making-process. The 
decision-making duration is calculated with the days between the start of the 
decision-making process, the proposal by the Commission, and the formal end of 
the decision-making process, which is a publication of the act in the Official 
Journal for legislative acts and which is different per non-legislative act. 
 
Table 3: Decision-making duration in days of completed legislative and non-
legislative actsa 
    Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Legislative 
acts 
Days between 
proposal and 
publication 
    462,35 446 206,69 115 1119 86 
Days between the 
start of the 
consultation and 
the completion of 
the act 
   590,73 561,50 297,42 95 1533 82 
        
Non-
legislative 
acts 
Days between 
proposal and 
completion 
    286,03 260 148,10 16 873 134 
Days between the 
start of the 
consultation and 
the completion of 
the act 
    448,80 370 293,72 16 1488 126 
a. Both consulted as unconsulted legislation are included. Unfinished legislative and non-
legislative acts are not, while they are included in the analysis. 
 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that it is misleading to solely look at the main institutions of the EU, such as 
the Council and the Parliament. Many significant decisions are made in the working groups of 
these institutions (committees and COREPER) (Fouilleux et al., 2005). However, there is no 
systematic data on the COREPER’s actions relating to the decision-making procedure available. 
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  In Table 3 the data for consulted and unconsulted legislative and non-
legislative acts is presented. It should be noted that while unfinished acts could 
not be included in this table, they are included in the analysis. The data shows 
that legislative acts on average take longer than non-legislative acts. Both the 
mean (462,35 compared to 286,03) and the median (446 compared to 260) are 
higher. Moreover, the shortest decision-making duration (the minimum), is 
considerably lower for non-legislative acts (16 compared to 115). This can be 
explained by the fact that reports and communications, which are both non-
legislative acts, are usually created quickly without the need of consent of other 
institutions while legislative acts have to follow the ordinary legislative 
procedure which is more time-consuming. 
The second measurement of decision-making duration that is used has 
one crucial difference in comparison with the first measurement. This second 
measurement includes the consultation process as part of the decision-making 
process because it is a crucial stage of the decision-making process. It produces 
extra time and effort when drawing a proposal, and likely later on in the process, 
which should be taken into account. The duration of legislative or non-legislative 
acts that were preceded by a consultation is now measured from the start of its 
consultation process until its completion as an act (Table 3). Legislative and non-
legislative acts without a consultation remain unchanged.  
However, including the consultation process in the measurement biases 
the consulted legislative and non-legislative acts to some extent because the ‘pre-
proposal’ stage of (non-)legislative acts that were not preceded by a consultation 
is not measured. Therefore the first measurement of the dependent variable is 
used to control for such a bias. Even with the bias it will give more insight in the 
effects of consultations on the decision-making. The second dependent variable 
does not change the relation between the characteristics of legislative and non-
legislative acts. For example, the minimal duration of non-legislative acts is still 
shorter than that of the legislative acts. 
 
Independent variable: stakeholder involvement 
Stakeholders refer to all actors from outside the EU, ranging from businesses to 
citizens, which have provided responses to the Commission’s online consultation 
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process. This data is derived from the Commission’s Your Voice in Europe 
website.  Stakeholder involvement is measured as the number of stakeholders 
reacting per consultation.  
 
Table 4: number of stakeholders involved in legislative and non-legislative acts 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Legislative acts 581,9 27 6423,7 0 85513 177 
Non-legislative acts 216,3 75 517,7 0 3056 179 
 
Table 4 shows that the number of stakeholders involved in this dataset 
ranges from 0 (unconsulted legislation) to 85513 stakeholders. Although the 
mean and maximum of stakeholders are higher for legislative acts than for non-
legislative acts, the median shows this is probably due to outliers that artificially 
raise the mean and maximum. The median shows that non-legislative acts attract 
more stakeholders than legislative acts (75 stakeholders in comparison with 27). 
This indicator helps me test the first hypothesis.  
Some of these 177 legislative acts and 179 non-legislative acts are 
excluded because they are outliers. Two consultations, resulting in 9571 and 
85513 submissions, are extremely deviant from other consultations. Most 
consultations (96,5%) lead to less than 1000 submissions. Hence these two cases 
are excluded from the analysis.  
The number of submissions in the analysis is somewhat different as 
described above because it is recoded in 10 categories. The first category only 
contains all legislative and non-legislative acts with 0 submissions, the following 
eight categories contain a range of 50 submissions per interval (1-50, 51-
100,…351-400), and the tenth interval contains legislative and non-legislative 
acts with 400+ submissions. The number of submissions as a scale-variable has 
such a great range that the effect of one increment change on the variable, 
meaning one more submission, is very small and hard to interpret in the analysis. 
Additionally, one submission should not make a difference on the decision-
making duration. The number of submissions should only create an effect in 
bigger numbers. The recoding not only makes the effect easier to interpret, it is 
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also more logical to expect the number of submissions to matter in greater 
numbers than to expect one submission to affect the decision-making duration.5 
Besides the testing of a cumulative effect of stakeholder involvement by 
linking the number of submissions to the decision-making duration, a control for 
stakeholder involvement by using a dummy-variable which indicates whether or 
not a consultation has preceded a legislative or non-legislative act is also 
included. According to Rasmussen and Toshkov (2013), any sort of consultation 
slows down the decision-making duration considerably.  
 
Independent variable: stakeholder heterogeneity 
The second independent variable is stakeholder heterogeneity which refers to 
the differences in who these stakeholders are, what their interests and 
preferences are, and how important these interests are to them. Unfortunately 
their interests and the value of importance of these interests are unknown 
without assessing this in a quantitative manner. However, by assessing who the 
stakeholders are one can derive their interests from their characteristics. As a 
result, the heterogeneity of interests is measured through the type of 
stakeholders providing consultation submissions. Although not all of the 
different types of stakeholders have different interests and not all of the same 
types have the same interests, the heterogeneity of preferences is likely to 
increase when the stakeholders are more different and diverse. Consequently, 
the diversity of stakeholders should be a fairly good indicator for heterogeneity 
and helps to test the second hypothesis.  
The stakeholders are classified in eight different groups (plus a ninth 
category ‘other’ for untraceable reactions) by using their individual reactions 
and the EU’s recurrent classification scheme to manually classify them. Even 
though this is not an official classification scheme, the EU almost always classifies 
in citizens, private organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
government organizations, and frequently adds categories such as research-
oriented stakeholders and local administrations. This study follows the same 
structure. 
                                                 
5 The recoding does not change the results of the analysis. The same effects in the models are 
significant and it does not affect other variables.  
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The usual suspects of stakeholders, who are indicated by their high means 
in comparison with other categories, are (1) the private profit-oriented 
organizations and associations, (2) public administrations of member states, (3) 
the non-profit oriented civil society organizations, (4) and individual citizens. In 
addition, more specific categories are used: (5) research-oriented organizations 
and academia, (6) local administrations, (7) EU-organizations such as EFTA or 
the ECB, (8) administrations from non-EU countries. 
 
Table 5: diversity of stakeholders in legislative and non-legislative acts 
 Legislative actsa Non-legislative actsa 
 N % Mean Std dev. N % Mean Std dev. 
Citizens 67 38,3 498,49 6206,73 76  44,2 91,76 340,94 
Private/profit organizations 89 50,9 49,99 180,62 102 59,3 57,49 86,35 
Non-profit/civil society 71 36,8 11,40 52,51 90 52,3 23,73 64,85 
Research/ academia 40 20,7 2,03 11,03 56 32,6 12,33 50,21 
Public administrations 84 43,5 12,26 37,97 105 61 14,77 21,86 
Local administrations 22 11,4 2,11 10,46 40 23,3 8,44 31,24 
EU-organizations 36 18,7 0,79 2,61 24 11,8 0,73 2,84 
Non-EU country 
administrations 
7 3,6 0,06 0,29 8 4,7 0,25 1,45 
Other 31 16,1 4,62 17,17 40 23,3 4,12 15,65 
a . N=175 legislative acts and 172 non-legislative acts 
 
The different categories are presented in Table 5. In this table the number 
(N) and the percentage (%) indicate the times the respective type of stakeholder 
is represented in a consultation that precedes a legislative or non-legislative act 
by at least one stakeholder. The mean and standard deviation indicate the overall 
average number of stakeholders of that type involved for all cases when that 
category is represented.  
 
Control variables: decision-making institutions and type of legislative act 
In order to control for alternative explanations that influence the decision-
making efficiency, the institutional setup, type of legislative act and the number 
of readings in the analysis are included as well. The institutional setup translates 
into the requirements for the adoption of legislative and non-legislative acts, 
which comes down to the formal decision-making institutions and how (and with 
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what procedure) the non-legislative and legislative acts move between and 
through those institutions. It is already explained that increasing the number of 
decision-makers in the decision making-process reduces its efficiency. By using 
PreLex and Legislative Observatory the institutions and the procedure of the 
(non-)legislative act could simply be measured with the number of formal 
decision-making institutions involved in the decision-making process. This 
information is used as an indicator of the decision-making institutions involved 
to test the third hypothesis. 
 
Table 6: mean of formal decisions by EU-institutions on finished legislative and 
non-legislative acts  
 Legislative acts  Non-legislative acts 
 N=87 N=182 
Commission (without corrigendum or amendment) 1,95 0,99 
Council 1,10 0,50 
Parliament 1,14 0,49 
European Economic and Social Committee 0,53 0,50 
Committee of Regions 0,05 0,30 
Court of auditors 0,01 0,00 
European Central Bank 0,24 0,00 
European Data Protection Supervisor 0,09 0,04 
Reconciliation Committee 0,02 0,00 
Total number of institutions involved 5,15 2,84 
 
Table 6 shows the averages of the decisions made by institutions per 
finished legislative and non-legislative act and the average of the total number of 
institutions involved per act. On average 5,15 institutions are involved during the 
legislative process. The Commission, Council and Parliament are always involved 
in the legislative process and take at least one decision during the first reading. 
Sometimes the process needs more readings to reach an agreement between the 
institutions; hence their number of decisions is on average over 1. Dummy-
variables of their involvement are also coded. 
In addition, this thesis focuses on the salience and procedure of the 
legislative act by using the type of legislative act as a control variable as well. As 
discussed above, legislative acts have different procedures than other acts 
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(implemented, delegated, e.g.), and the different types of legislative acts 
(directive, regulation, e.g.) have different levels of salience. Both the Legislative 
Observatory and PreLex categorize the proposals of legislative acts and the 
publications in the Official Journal. There is no incongruence between them. The 
indicator to measure the type of the legislative act is fairly easily constructed by 
deriving the type of legislative act from these databases. This will help testing the 
fourth hypothesis.  
 
Table 7: number of finished and unfinished acts per procedurea 
 Own-
initiative 
Non-
legislative 
enactment 
Co-decision Consultation  Consent 
Communication 128 0 0 0 0 
Decision 0 2 12 1 0 
Directive 0 0 21 7 0 
Green paper 23 0 1 0 0 
Proposal for a decision 0 2 5 1 0 
Proposal for a directive 0 6 45 4 0 
Proposal for a 
regulation 
0 
1 46 
1 
2 
Recommendation 1 1 0 0 0 
Regulation 0 0 47 0 0 
Report 21 0 0 0 0 
Resolution of EP 7 1 0 0 0 
White paper 2 0 0 0 0 
Working paper 1 0 0 0 0 
a. Both consulted as unconsulted legislation are included 
 
Table 7 gives an overview of the different types of legislative and non-
legislative acts considered in this thesis. As a result of the focus on legislative 
acts, most of the acts are the result of one of the co-decision procedures, or in 
other words, the ordinary procedure. Other acts are the result of the two special 
legislative procedures, the consultation procedure and the consent procedure, 
and other non-legislative procedures. Communications, green and white papers, 
and reports do not follow a strict procedure and are created on the own initiative 
of the Commission. Although there are other procedures, these are less common 
and apparently not used in combination with consultations.  
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Additionally, the number of readings is also a control-variable. Not only is 
it logical that having two readings takes longer than having one, it could also help 
interpret the differences between different procedures. While most non-
legislative acts do not follow the structure of readings, all legislative acts do. 
Additional readings could of course also increase the decision-making duration 
and might cause the difference in duration between legislative and non-
legislative acts. Hence this variable is included.  
 
Determinants of EU’s decision-making efficiency 
After presenting the argument and the research design, this argument will now 
be tested by relying on a time-to-event analysis, otherwise known as survival 
analysis. A semi-parametric Cox model is used, because I do not have any a priori 
assumptions about the distribution of the decision-making duration (Rasmussen 
and Toshkov, 2013; Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013). The event in the analyses is the 
completion of a legislative or non-legislative act, meaning that when the event 
does not occur it indicates that a legislative or non-legislative act is not 
completed. Because this analysis uses a time span these unfinished acts are still 
useful in this analysis. With this survival analysis the effects of different factors 
on the decision-making efficiency, including stakeholders, will be tested. 
Each of the analyses is executed with three different models. The first 
model includes only legislative acts (consulted and unconsulted) and uses the 
dependent variable of decision-making duration that excludes the consultation 
process from the measurement. Model 2 has a different case selection in 
comparison to Model 1 but uses the same dependent variable. It includes not 
only all legislative acts, but also all consulted and unconsulted non-legislative 
acts. Model 3 differs from Model 1 on the dependent variable by including the 
consultation process in the measurement of decision-making duration, but uses a 
similar case selection as Model 1. 
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Table 8: determinants of the duration of the decision-making process in the EU 
Variables Model 1: 
Legislative acts 
Model 2: 
Legislative and non-legislative acts 
Model 3:  
Legislative acts with duration 
including the consultation process 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Directive -0,282 
(0,249) 
-0,989* 
(0,236) 
-0,50 
(0,248) 
Readings -0,815* 
(0,412) 
-1,528* 
(0,179) 
-0,519 
(0,362) 
Number of institutions 0,383* 
(0,162) 
0,046 
(0,095) 
0,380* 
(0,160) 
Parliament 12,557 
(88,518) 
0,043 
(0,191) 
12,741 
(84,557) 
EESC -0,485 
(0,288) 
-0,176 
(0,185) 
-0,546 
(0,288) 
CoR -1,488 
(1,017) 
-0,509* 
(0,213) 
-1,608 
(1,015) 
Number of submissions 0,233* 
(0,119) 
-0,014 
(0,047) 
0,274* 
(0,122) 
Diversity of stakeholders 0,210 
(0,128) 
0,125 
(0,096) 
0,009 
(0,145) 
Consultation -0,934 
(0,649) 
-0,699 
(0,452) 
-1,815* 
(0,675) 
    
N 164 280 161 
-2 Log Likelihood 614,071 1690,167 589,059 
a. * < 0.05, ** < 0.01 
b. Standard errors in parentheses 
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General factors affecting EU’s decision-making efficiency 
The empirical results from the Cox regressions (Table 8) are somewhat 
surprising and ambiguous. Nonetheless, the influence of the type of legislative 
act, directives to be more specific, falls in line with the expectation. In each 
model, directives have a slower decision-making process than other types of acts. 
Still, this effect is only significant when including non-legislative acts (Model 2). 
It could be non-significant for legislative acts because of the relatively small N, 
considering all the different types of legislative acts. Moreover, non-legislative 
acts include acts such as communications and papers which do not follow the 
legislative procedure, making it easier (and faster) to complete the decision-
making process. In comparison with these acts the decision-making of all 
legislative acts is slower.6 Nevertheless, all models indicate the same direction of 
the effect of directives. Although its effect is not significant for legislative acts 
(Model 1 and 3), the results are congruent with the findings of previous studies 
(Golub, 2008; Schulz and König, 2000). Consequently, it does provide some 
support for H4 in which directives were expected to slow down the decision-
making process. 
The effect of readings is also in line with the expectation. It seems that 
more readings slow down the decision-making process (Model 1). Its 
commonsensical that on average a legislative act takes longer to finish when it 
needs two readings in comparison to one reading, because more readings lead to 
more meetings, more decisions and thus more time needed to finish a legislative 
act. The inclusion of non-legislative acts, which don’t have any readings at all, 
seem to support the argument. Including these acts create more variation (0 
readings are now also included) which increases the coefficient (from -0,815 to -
1,528), indicating a stronger significant effect.  
When including the consultation process in the measurement it creates a 
situation in which a consulted legislative act that needs only one reading could 
take longer to finish than an unconsulted legislative act with two readings. Hence 
the effect is not significant in Model 3. The effect of the readings is negated by the 
                                                 
6 When a dummy-variable indicating the difference between legislative and non-legislative acts is 
added to Model 1, it results in a significant (p < 0.05) coefficient of -1,105. 
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effect of consultations, indicated by the significant effect of the consultation-
variable.  
 The effect of the number of institutions, however, is a different story. In 
Model 1 and 3 the number of institutions has a positive and significant effect on 
the decision-making duration of legislative acts, meaning it increases the speed 
of the decision-making process (Model 1 and 3). The number of institutions 
involved does not affect the duration of the decision-making of non-legislative 
acts (Model 2). The positive effect of the number of institutions in both models 
with legislative acts is contrary to the effects assumed with H3 in which the 
number of institutions was expected to slow down the decision-making process. 
Therefore H3 must be rejected. Nevertheless, the findings are unlikely to be the 
case. Its effect is conflicting with all theoretical arguments and empirical results 
of previous studies which have been excellent in pointing out that including 
more decision-makers slows down the decision-making process (Schulz and 
König, 2000). Perhaps the variation of different institutions has been different in 
comparison with other studies. Still, there is insufficient information to explain 
this result.  
Explaining the effect of the number of institutions on the decision-making 
duration becomes especially difficult when considering the effect of the EESC and 
CoR. The results of both institutions indicate that their inclusion does not have a 
significant effect on the decision-making duration of legislative acts. However, 
when comparing these negative effects to the positive significant effect of the 
number of institutions, the effect of the number of institutions becomes even 
more remarkable.  
 The relation of the number of institutions becomes clearer when 
analyzing the effect of the European Parliament in the decision-making. The 
Parliament itself seems not to affect the duration of the decision-making of 
legislative acts significantly, even though the positive coefficient is relatively big 
(12,557) (Model 1). Changing the dependent variable in Model 3 does not lead to 
different results. This is also very conflicting with the current literature that 
underlines that the Parliament is the prime example of an institution slowing 
down the EU decision-making (Kardasheva, 2009; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004).  
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This incongruence with previous studies concerning the Parliament can 
be explained by the difference in timespan between previous studies and this 
study. This study concentrates on the post-Lisbon period while other studies 
have covered the period before the Lisbon Treaty. Since 2009 almost all 
legislative acts are required to go through the Parliament, making the Parliament 
fully part of the decision-making process. Therefore a comparison between 
legislative acts that were decided upon by the Parliament and those which were 
not is flawed. The only comparison possible is whether a legislative act has 
already reached the Parliament or has yet to do so.  Consequently, the role of the 
European Parliament in the decision-making and its effect on the decision-
making has changed. In addition, including non-legislative acts that not always 
include the Parliament in their decision-making process leads to a coefficient of 
0,043 (Model 2). This could indicate that that the low variation on the inclusion 
of the Parliament in Model 1 distorts its effect. 
 Still, when comparing the effect of the Parliament on the decision-making 
with the effect of the number of institutions shows a link between them. When 
the Parliament has a high positive effect (Model 1 and 3), the number of 
institutions has a significant effect, and when the effect of the Parliament is very 
low (Model 2), so is the effect of the number of institutions. The Parliament 
seems to alter the relationship of the number of institutions on the decision-
making speed, which would partly explain the positive effect of the number of 
institutions and the incongruence with the effect of the inclusion of the CoR and 
EESC. 
 The difference between the effect of the EESC and CoR with the 
Parliament indicates that some institutions slow down decision-making while 
others do not.  Because the EESC and CoR are (mandatory) advisory institutions 
they represent different interests than legislative bodies such as the Parliament. 
Including the EESC and CoR would then change the heterogeneity of interests 
between institutions while the involvement of the Parliament would not. 
Consequently, it is more likely to conclude that the decision-making efficiency is 
influenced by which institutions join the decision-making process rather than by 
the sheer number of institutions. 
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Stakeholder involvement affecting EU’s decision-making efficiency 
If we turn to the effects of consultations and the influence of stakeholders on the 
decision-making duration the results are again surprising. First of all, the effect 
of consultations on the decision-making duration as found by Rasmussen and 
Toshkov (2013) cannot be confirmed. The effect of consultations on the decision-
making process of legislative acts, or non-legislative acts, is not significant. 
Nonetheless, the direction of the effect (slowing down decision-making) is 
similar to Rasmussen and Toshkov’s results (Model 1 and 2). The effect is 
stronger and significant in Model 3, but most likely the result of including the 
consultation process in the measurement of decision-making duration. Because 
of this bias its effect should not be overstated. 
 Furthermore, not only the effect of consultations is deviant from 
Rasmussen and Toshkov’s conclusions. Despite the expectation that stakeholder 
involvement slows down the decision-making, the number of submissions 
actually significantly decreases the decision-making duration (Model 1). The 
effect is slightly stronger in Model 3 because of the bias of the dependent 
variable. The inclusion of non-legislative acts (Model 2) seems to reverse the 
effect of number of submissions in Model 1, which is likely to be caused by the 
fact that some of these non-legislative acts do not need approval from the Council 
or Parliament. This prevents conflict between the interests of the stakeholders 
with the decision-making institutions. When there is no conflict of interests to 
overcome, it cannot lead to a longer decision-making duration. Moreover, many 
of these non-legislative acts are only meant to report on the consultations. 
Consequently, there is no reason to assume a conflict of interests or more 
administrative work to integrate their interests in most of these non-legislative 
acts. The weaker effect of consultations on the decision-making process in Model 
2 seems to coincide with this and support the lesser effect on non-legislative acts. 
Although it was assumed that submissions mean more opinions and interests 
involved in the process – which was expected to lead to more administrative 
work and more conflict with the interests of the European Parliament and thus 
higher transaction costs for bargaining – which should make it more difficult to 
reach a decision, the results indicate the opposite. As a result, H1 which assumed 
this effect must be rejected.  
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Nevertheless, Rasmussen and Toshkov (2013) have also presented 
several arguments how involving stakeholders can decrease the decision-making 
duration. First, stakeholders can act as transmission belts or gatekeepers 
between the views of the citizens and the decision-makers. The alternative 
would be that legislators have to deal with each citizen individually which, of 
course, would increase the transaction costs of legislative bargaining and 
‘require a greater time investment to resolve matters’ (Rasmussen and Toshkov 
2013: 10). Second, the preparation of proposals with the help of stakeholders 
could resolve conflicts that otherwise would have to be resolved in the decision-
making process. Proposals would then be less controversial when introduced 
and thus would lead to lower transaction costs of bargaining. More submissions 
of stakeholders in comparison with less submissions would then not only 
increase the function as the transmission belt, but would also resolve more 
conflicts before the proposal is introduced7.  
The positive relationship between stakeholder involvement and decision-
making duration, and thus decision-making efficiency, indicates that the EU 
could be able to integrate stakeholders’ interests without any negative 
consequences for the decision-making process. More importantly, it can actually 
increase its efficiency. Still, the possible enhancement of the legitimacy of the 
decision-making process though these stakeholders has not been the focus of 
this study and is, therefore, unknown. This can only be proven by analyzing the 
content of legislation by checking whether stakeholders’ interests are actually 
integrated into the decision-making. The critique on whether the intensifying of 
the consultation process addresses this democratic deficit will otherwise remain 
unchallenged (Finke, 2007; Saurugger, 2008; Kohler-Koch, 2010).  
Although this study cannot measure whether the involvement of 
stakeholders actually creates more input and output legitimacy, a faster decision-
making could imply less conflict and thus more input and output legitimacy. In 
this light it would seem reasonable to conclude that online consultations are 
increasing the legitimacy of the decision-making in a functional way that 
                                                 
7
 A positive relation between the number of days from the start of a consultation till start of the 
legislative act with the number of submissions would show the extra work of solving conflicts. 
However, there is no significant positive correlation, probably because the number of days can also 
increase when very few stakeholders submit and the Commission lengthens the time to submit to gain 
more submissions. 
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maintains the efficiency of the decision-making. Indeed, these results could 
indicate that the EU has found a way to address the democratic deficit by actively 
intensifying the contacts with societal groups through consultations. If so, there 
is no trade-off between legitimacy and efficiency and both can be simultaneously 
reinforced. 
However, it should be considered that these results may be somewhat 
biased. The results concerning decision-making institutions and directives could 
not be confirmed, which is highly unlikely and, consequently, makes it difficult to 
accept the empirical results of stakeholder involvement on the decision-making 
efficiency. 
Another way stakeholders can affect the decision-making duration is with 
the heterogeneity of their interests. However, the heterogeneity of their 
interests, indicated by the diversity of stakeholders, shows no significant effect in 
any of the models. The representation of each type of stakeholder does not affect 
the decision-making. Hence H2, which assumed that the heterogeneity of 
interests affects the decision-making efficiency negatively, must be rejected. The 
positive direction of its effect is the opposite of what was assumed. Just like the 
number of submissions, the diversity of stakeholders was expected to slow down 
decision-making. Following the same reasoning as for the positive effect of the 
number of submissions one could say that a greater diversity of stakeholders 
increases the chance of resolving different kinds of conflicts before the decision-
making. However, these results seem to indicate that it only matters how many 
stakeholders are involved and that that their specific interests do not matter. 
Remarkably, a contrarian deduction was established between the importance of 
the heterogeneity and the number of interests regarding the decision-making 
institutions.  
Furthermore, Rasmussen and Toshkov point out that the organizational 
type is questionable as an indicator for the actual degree of preference conflict 
among participants (2013:  26). However, they also claim that the sheer number 
would not indicate the preference conflict while this study has proven that it 
does affect the decision-making duration. The number of submissions of each 
type of stakeholder has to be broken down to really grasp its effect on the 
decision-making duration, and thus its efficiency.  
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Table 9: stakeholder involvement on the duration of the decision-making process  
 
Model 1: 
Legislative acts 
Model 2: 
Legislative and non-legislative 
acts 
Model 3:  
Legislative acts with duration 
including consultation 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Number of submissions 0,005  
(0,006) 
0,004  
(0,003) 
0,001  
(0,006) 
Citizen submissions -0,008  
(0,009) 
-0,005  
(0,003) 
-0,001  
(0,007) 
Private submissions -0,004  
(0,009) 
-0,003  
(0,004) 
-0,004  
(0,011) 
Civil submissions -0,014  
(0,030) 
-0,002  
(0,007) 
-0,001  
(0,025) 
Citizen submissions ratio -0,002  
(2,669) 
1,037  
(1,109) 
-0,336  
(2,197) 
Private submissions ratio 2,074  
(2,881) 
1,443  
(1,190) 
1,750  
(2,822) 
Civil submissions ratio 3,610  
(5,815) 
1,745  
(1,496) 
0,170  
(4,871) 
Ratio differences  (7 groups) -2,974  
(1,800) 
-1,799  
(0,960) 
-2,488  
(1,871) 
Ratio differences (4 groups) 2,057 
(1,803) 
0,691  
(0,864) 
1,193  
(1,712) 
Private-civil balance 0,295  
(3,039) 
0,786  
(1,330) 
0,230  
(3,025) 
N 168 296 165 
-2 Log Likelihood 681,866 1918,453 677,866 
a. * < 0.05, ** < 0.01 
b. Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 9 breaks down the number of submissions by types of stakeholders 
on legislative acts (Model 1 and 3) and for legislative and non-legislative acts 
(Model 2). These models only underline the absence of a relationship between 
the diversity of stakeholders and the decision-making duration. None of the 
submissions from a type of stakeholder, as well as any of the ratios seem to have 
a significant effect on the duration of the decision-making process. Although not 
all types are included in Table 9, none of them have any significant effect. 
Apparently it does not increase the administrative work during the preparation 
of legislative and non-legislative acts by increasing the heterogeneity of interests 
that need to be integrated, nor does it create conflict with the interests of 
legislative institutions such as the European Parliament. As a result, 
heterogeneity of interests of stakeholders does not affect the decision-making 
efficiency. 
 
Conclusions 
This thesis has tried to show the effects of stakeholder involvement on the EU’s 
decision-making process efficiency. With a unique dataset of legislative acts and 
non-legislative acts it has shown that, unexpectedly, stakeholders through online 
consultations affect the decision-making efficiency positively. When more 
stakeholders are included in the consultation process, regardless of the 
heterogeneity of their interests, it speeds up the decision-making process of 
legislative acts. Stakeholders work as a transmission belt for citizens and solve 
and prevent conflicts before the decision-making process which speeds up the 
decision-making process. However, this is not the case for non-legislative acts. 
Although the results concerning stakeholder involvement are clear, this 
study has its limitations which should be taken into account. Most importantly, 
this thesis has some issues concerning the case selection. The case selection of 
legislative and non-legislative acts preceded by consultations is limited to 2009 
and 2010 while these consultations have been around longer and have 
intensified over the last few years. Consequently, the data selection is not 
entirely representative for online public stakeholder involvement and especially 
not for other forms of stakeholder involvement. 
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In addition, it was problematic to select cases of non-legislative acts and 
legislative acts that were not preceded by a consultation. Although the EU tries to 
archive all documents of all legislative and non-legislative acts and of the 
consultations, documents are sometimes missing or not accessible. Without 
these documents it can be difficult to assess whether stakeholders were involved.  
Furthermore, like any other study within the field of decision-making 
efficiency, the measurement of efficiency lies with the mechanical side of 
efficiency. The other side of efficiency, substantive efficiency, is not measured. 
Only capturing half of the concept of decision-making efficiency creates troubles 
concerning the validity.  
Nevertheless, this study has been valuable in tracing the consequences of 
stakeholder involvement on the decision-making process and its efficiency, 
which has been understudied. In addition, it also shows some important 
indications for the use of stakeholders to increase the decision-making 
legitimacy. This effect of stakeholder involvement is the best possible conclusion 
for the EU concerning its legitimacy issues. Even if the legitimacy does not 
increase with the use of stakeholder involvement, stakeholder involvement at 
least does not influence the efficiency negatively. Possibly, it can even reinforce 
both aspects simultaneously. 
Some still question whether these consultations do create a more 
participatory system and not only reinforce the functional way of governing in 
the EU. Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered with this study. The 
implications for the EU’s online consultations with stakeholders, and mainly for 
the EU’s legitimacy problems, can only be truly determined with a qualitative 
study that focusses on the outcome of the decision-making process and the 
substantive involvement of stakeholders by analyzing the interests of 
stakeholders and their degree of integration in the proposals of legislative acts.  
Without this proposed future studies the final conclusion on stakeholder 
involvement on the EU’s decision-making process and its legitimacy will remain 
undecided. The improvement of the decision-making efficiency by stakeholder 
involvement would be more reliable when the study could be repeated without 
the flaws described above. Nonetheless, this study can confirm that the sheer 
number of stakeholders involved in the consultation process, regardless of their 
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heterogeneity of interests, increases the decision-making efficiency. Instead of 
confirming the negative expectations laid out in this thesis, it seems that 
involving stakeholders through online public consultations actually can improve 
the EU’s decision-making process, by acting as transmission belts and by 
preventing conflicts in the decision-making, without any repercussions 
concerning its efficiency. 
 35 
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